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The 2014 Illinois Governor Race:  Quinn vs. Rauner 
Introduction                                                                                      
The 2014 Governor’s race in Illinois featured two candidates who are the epitome of campaigns 
for high office in America today.  In addition, the race also illustrated the major trends, driven by 
big money and big media, which are shaping our politics in the 21st century.  This paper 
examines and analyzes the governor’s race in order to learn what it teaches us about politics in 
Illinois, and in the United States midway through the second decade of this century. 
In Pat Quinn the voters of Illinois had the choice of a candidate who was in many ways a classic 
big city Irish pol.  He had been in politics in Chicago and Illinois all of his adult life, and he had 
never really done anything else outside a career in public service.  He was a graduate of 
Georgetown University and Northwestern University’s School of Law. He started his career in 
the 1970s as a political operative for former Illinois Governor Dan Walker.  After working for 
Walker, Quinn repeatedly sought, and often won, political office or worked near government for 
a brief stint in a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) which he founded to advance his 
causes.   
The fact that Quinn spent his formative young adult years working for Dan Walker is significant.  
Walker was a maverick who never got along with the regular Democratic Party organization and 
he fought the Daley Machine in Chicago with a crusader’s zeal.  He used that opposition to 
Daley to catapult himself to an upset victory over Lt. Governor Paul Simon in the 1972 
Democratic Primary.   
Walker then beat Republican Richard Ogilvie, the incumbent, in the general election in 
November, 1972.  This victory ushered in a stormy and conflict-ridden single term in the 
governor’s office for Walker where he often fought with Mayor Richard J. Daley and the leaders 
of both parties. Walker also did not work well with the General Assembly, either Republicans or 
Democrats, during his term in office.  As a result, he was not considered to be an effective 
governor and was rather handily beaten by the party organization’s candidate, Michael Howlett, 
in the 1976 Democratic Primary.  Howlett was then beaten by James R. Thompson in the general 
election, and this victory, the first of seven for the GOP, initiated a stretch of twenty six 
consecutive years of Republican rule in the governor’s office.   
In numerous characteristics, Pat Quinn was an apt disciple of his original mentor, Dan Walker.  
He was always known as a reformer and something of a lone wolf who cultivated the outsider 
image. Quinn was also considered to be a loose cannon by the party establishment.  He 
frequently had difficulty in getting along with and reaching compromises with the other leaders 
of his own party and with the Republicans in government.   
After he left the Walker Administration Quinn was the head of the Campaign for Political 
Honesty which he founded. Using this platform he pushed through the “Cutback Amendment” 
which reduced the size of the Illinois House from 177 to 117 seats and eliminated the state’s 
unique cumulative voting, or multi-member districts plan (Illinois Blue Book, 1993-94, 31).  
Most practical politicians on both sides of the aisle opposed this amendment, and its passage was 
seen as a sharp rebuke to the state’s political establishment and a populist uprising against the 
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entrenched powers in Springfield and Chicago.  This interpretation was fine with Quinn since he 
wanted to be known as the reformer who constantly promised to shake up the status quo.  It is 
somewhat ironic that much later, after he had been elected governor in his own right in 2010, he 
was charged by Bruce Rauner with abuses of power in the operation of a neighborhood violence 
grants program and with the same kinds of patronage politics Quinn had always fought against 
throughout his career. 
The fact that Quinn billed himself as an outsider did not prevent him from almost constantly 
seeking public office or serving in appointed and elected offices. In 1982 he was elected to the 
Cook County Board of Property Tax Appeals and was also appointed by the late Mayor, Harold 
Washington, to the position of Revenue Director for the City of Chicago (Illinois Blue Book, 
2013-2014, 21).  The stint with the Washington Administration also came back to dog Quinn 
during the Democratic Primary in 2010 and again during the general election in 2014 when his 
opponents used some of Harold Washington’s negative quotes about Quinn against him in their 
television commercials.   
Quinn then utilized his notoriety as a reformer and the champion of the Cutback Amendment to 
mount a successful race for State Treasurer where he served from 1991 to 1995. In 2002 Quinn 
won the Democratic Primary for Lieutenant Governor and in the general election he was paired 
with Rod Blagojevich who was elected governor.  In that era, unlike now, the Lt. Governor and 
Governor candidates did not have to run as a team, and Quinn was on the Blagojevich ticket by 
virtue of winning the primary on his own.  That turned out to be fortuitous for him later when 
Blagojevich was removed from office via impeachment and conviction by the Illinois House and 
Senate, an unprecedented milestone for the State of Illinois.  In the meantime, Blagojevich and 
Quinn won re-election handily over Republicans Judy Barr Topinka and Joe Birkett in 2006.   
Quinn’s Record as Governor 
Upon Rod Blagojevich’s removal from office by the Illinois General Assembly, Pat Quinn was 
sworn in as governor on January 29, 2009.   He was re-elected to his first full term on November 
2, 2010.  During his first years in office Quinn took on a host of challenges for Illinois 
government the most notable of which had to do with the state’s having too little money and too 
much debt. For years critics had been warning that Illinois had a “structural deficit” which 
simply meant that the state was committed to more programs and personnel than the income the 
state generated each year could cover.  This imbalance resulted in a series of stop-gap measures 
which allowed the state to temporize with its deficit and move along to the next fiscal year but 
never honestly face the problem and fix it.  Quinn promised to do something real about the 
structural deficit and the backlog of unpaid bills. Early in 2011 with the crucial support of the 
Democratic leadership in the Illinois House and Senate, Quinn persuaded a majority of his 
colleagues to go along with a tax increase, and the new revenue it generated allowed the state to 
start addressing some of the deep stack of accumulated bills which it did with new revenue for 
FY2011 through half of FY2015 (Long, October 16, 2014, 26-27).  The new tax rate was billed 
as “temporary” although many observers believed that it would never be allowed to expire at the 
end of 2014 since it was the only plan the state had for finally addressing the structural deficit 
that had haunted Illinois for decades.        
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The passage of the personal and corporate income tax increase conditioned almost everything 
else in the campaign and was the major topic of conflict between Quinn and Rauner in the 2014 
election. Nothing more starkly divided the two candidates and this issue was certainly one of the 
defining conflicts of the campaign (The New York Times, March 22, 2014, A23). 
The personal income tax had been increased from 3.0 to 5 percent and the corporate rate had 
increased from 4.8 to 7 percent.  The increase was scheduled to expire on January 1, 2015 with 
the rates contracting to 3.75 percent for individuals and 5.25 for corporations on that date (Long, 
October 16, 2014, 26-27).  The resulting hole in the budget of approximately two billion dollars 
for FY 2015 and of over four billion dollars for FY2016, beginning July 1, 2015 was the major 
difference between Quinn and Rauner as they fought for the governor’s office in the summer and 
fall of 2014.  Quinn vigorously defended the increase as absolutely necessary and fiscally 
responsible.  Rauner and the Republicans and many of their allies in the business world attacked 
it just as vigorously as the critics charged that Illinois was a high tax state with a declining 
economy steadily losing jobs to its neighbors.   
Added to that conflict was a deep disagreement over the Illinois public employee pension 
system.  The system was widely reported to be approximately $100 billion in deficit which was 
the nation’s worst deficit for a state system.  For many years, under both parties, Illinois 
governors and legislators had failed to pay the state’s share of the pension obligations, which 
they called “taking a pension holiday” or had borrowed money to make the required payments.  
The General Assembly and the governor finally passed a bill in 2012 which was supposed to 
start on the pay back and reduction of the deficit.  It was declared unconstitutional by a lower 
state court and the issue was before the state supreme court during the governor’s race.  This 
conflict also divided the two candidates as Quinn stood for the current law and maintained that it 
was constitutional and essential to the financial health of Illinois while Rauner denounced it 
although his own plans for what to do if the court threw the plan out were ambiguous. Almost 
the entire conversation in the 2014 governor’s race boiled down to the budget, taxes and 
pensions.  Quinn had a record and legislation that he had supported and campaigned for while 
Rauner had a vague plan to depend on future revenue growth driven by the economic growth and 
increased employment that he contended his policies would produce.   
So, Quinn came into the general election contest with a host of liabilities.  He had managed to 
alienate many members of the Illinois General Assembly especially when he put their pay checks 
on hold in a heavy-handed attempt to pressure them into passing the pensions bill.  The pensions 
bill was deeply opposed by the public employee unions and state retirees. The tax increase, like 
all tax increases, was overwhelmingly unpopular with the public (Jackson and Leonard, June 
2014). Quinn had closed numerous state facilities and reduced the size of the state’s employment 
rolls significantly.  In fact, Illinois had the lowest number of state employees per capita in the 
nation and Quinn further reduced their numbers.  All of this was done in a quest for budget 
savings.  While the legislators all said they wanted to address the deficit, when it came to closing 
state facilities and losing state jobs in their own areas, they were vociferous in their 
condemnation of the governor’s actions.  The mass public, particularly those who had jobs and 
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families affected by the closings, also were clearly not supportive of the closings and the claimed 
cost savings. 
In short, the election agenda driven by both candidates and the mass media turned out to focus 
almost entirely on taxes, the budget, the pension problem, jobs and the overall economic 
situation in Illinois and governmental management in general.  All of these were agenda issues 
that favored Rauner instead of Quinn.   
Quinn’s Campaign 
At the outset Quinn needed to duplicate his 2010 victory and improve on his razor thin margins 
if at all possible.  Quinn had only beaten State Senator Bill Brady of Bloomington by 
approximately 31,000 votes statewide in 2010.  Quinn carried only Cook County, and three 
downstate counties, Alexander, Jackson, and St. Clair.  Ironically, Quinn then closed prisons or 
other state facilities in Alexander and Jackson counties in order to save money and move toward 
a balanced budget. However, those specific actions were deeply unpopular in those counties 
where the closures took place and were widely condemned by all of the legislators from southern 
Illinois.  If Quinn was running for office for a second elected term, it was hard to discern the 
political strategy undergirding these choices.   
Quinn also had some assets.  He had passed a thirty-one billion dollar capital improvements plan 
through the General Assembly in 2009.  This allowed him to cut a lot of ribbons over the next 
four years. He also claimed that it had created more than 430,000 jobs.  The Illinois 
unemployment rate fell to 6.6 in October which was progress even though that rate was still 
almost a point above the national average of 5.8 which was the lowest it had been since before 
the Great Recession of 2008-09.  Illinois, like the nation, was clearly coming out of the dark days 
of the recession, although like the nation also, the rate of recovery was frustratingly slow.  This 
provided ammunition to the critics who continued to emphasize the shortcomings in the 
economy and apparently dissuaded the Democrats from trying to capitalize on the undeniable 
upturn in most economic indicators when 2009 is compared to 2014.  People consistently listed 
jobs and the economy as their number one concern and the narrative took over that both were 
sadly lacking in comparison to past recoveries and the Democrats consistently failed to counter 
that dominant narrative about the economy.   
As the fall of 2014 approached, Quinn was often found out and about in the hinterland of Illinois 
announcing some new facility, a new stretch of highway, a bridge to be built or some new state 
program which he maintained would increase jobs and bring prosperity.  He was also able to 
announce a number of private sector company expansions or relocations, and these were often 
accompanied by state tax rebates, infrastructure improvements, or worker training incentives 
paid for by the state.  Perhaps the splashiest announcement was of a new 1.4 billion dollar 
fertilizer plant for Champaign County which came the week before the election.  All of these 
new plants and job announcements gave Quinn some real accomplishments to tout as a part of 
his case for re-election, and the Governor was never shy about claiming credit for his 
administration.  Nationally and in Illinois the Democrats had an objective case which could be 
made about economic progress and jobs growth since the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, but 
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they simply failed to make it persuasively enough to help their ticket in the mid-term elections 
and thus they lost almost all the closely contested races.     
Stewardship of the state’s budget and management of the economy became the overall themes 
for both candidates.  Whether Illinois was well on the way to economic recovery or mired in debt 
and steadily declining were the competing narratives for this race, and the negative narrative won 
out. 
Rauner’s Campaign 
No one could argue the case for the decline of Illinois better and more forcefully than Bruce 
Rauner.  He was a private equity investor who had amassed a vast fortune through his company, 
GTCR.  Data he reluctantly released during the campaign season showed that his income for 
2013 had been $60.1 million for that one year alone.  He was reported to own nine homes in a 
collection of states.  He had a long time record of philanthropy and civic activity in the Chicago 
area, but he had never run for public office before and had never received much public scrutiny.  
Outside elite circles in Chicago, he was virtually unknown downstate and by average voters 
when he started the race. 
This did not prevent Rauner from winning the Illinois Republican Primary in March of 2014.  In 
that race there were three current office holders who were also political insiders versus one 
outsider who had made his name and personal fortune as a businessman.  Bruce Rauner, the CEO 
and business mogul won against the three respected and veteran Republican politicians thus 
setting up the highly contentious and enormously expensive race for governor in the general 
election on November 4, 2014.  
Rauner is a model of a kind of new candidate both parties, but especially the Republican Party, 
are recruiting for high level office including governor, senator and president.  He is a self-made 
business man and mega-millionaire with no prior governmental experience and no record of 
having run for office previously. Thus he had no public record to defend. He wanted to start at 
the top rather than patiently working his way up through a series of successive offices as most 
traditional high office holders have been required to do.    He was also quite willing to self-
finance much of his own campaign particularly in the crucial early campaign period when money 
is usually scarce and hard to raise. He put a reported $27 million of his own money into his 
campaign.   To these super rich candidates investing in one’s own campaign is just another 
venture in financing a “start-up” even though in this case the start-up is the candidate’s own 
drive for  office and control of public power. 
The Republicans are the party of business and they constantly claim that “government should be 
run like a business”. The current governor of Florida, Rick Scott, and the current governor of 
Michigan, Rick Snyder, are good examples of this model. Former New York City Mayor, 
Michael Bloomberg, who at the time he ran for Mayor was reputed to be the wealthiest man in 
the city, spent over $70 million to capture city hall the first time.  He then came back for a 
second term victory fueled by even more millions of his personal fortune. He went from CEO of 
Bloomberg News to CEO of New York City in one leap.   
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Meg Whitman, who was the CEO of Ebay, ran for the governorship of California in 2010 and 
put $144 million of her own personal fortune into the race.  If she had won, Whitman would have 
been another such high level CEO example, but she lost to Jerry Brown who had already been 
governor previously and who is the kind of career politician Pat Quinn epitomizes.  So, in some 
respects, the Illinois race pitted the old model veteran pol versus the new model business 
entrepreneur turned office-seeker looking for a second career, and both tend to represent their 
own party’s distinctive values and approach to winning office and governing.    
The Study 
This paper documents and analyzes the race, how Rauner won and where.  It also provides data 
on the Illinois Primary and demonstrates how the primary was related to and foreshadowed some 
of the results for the general election.  The unit of analysis here is the county and the county level 
voting returns were provided by the Illinois State Board of Elections, information which is 
available at (http://www.elections.il.gov/electioninformaqtion/VoteTotalList.aspx?).  The 
aggregate data are supplemented by poll results and by media coverage where they are 
appropriate and available.   
The Democratic Primary Results 
Quinn’s campaign faced an uphill slog from the beginning.  He also got off to something of a 
slow start in the Democratic Primary.  He had what was supposed to be only token opposition in 
the form of Tio Hardiman who was an African-American community activist from Chicago. 
Hardiman had no name recognition, no money, and no prospects for defeating a sitting governor.  
However, in spite of mounting a virtually invisible campaign, outside a few Chicagoland media 
events, he managed to win 125,000 votes which was 28 percent of the total. This was an 
unprecedented number of votes for such an obscure contender to receive against an incumbent 
governor.   
As can be seen from Map A, Pat Quinn won Cook County and the all-important Collar Counties 
in the primary although not without some difficulty.  Hardiman managed to carry 30 counties 
total, mostly in central and southern Illinois, where the voters had no idea who Tio Hardiman 
was (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014, 5-8).  The vote for Hardiman was widely interpreted 
as a protest vote indicating the real difficulties Pat Quinn faced in his re-election campaign for 
the fall. (See Appendix A and Map A for the results of the Democratic Primary).   
 Quinn’s total vote and the number of counties he carried against an unknown opponent 
were unimpressive.  His vote total would have him place second, not far ahead of Kirk Dillard, if 
he had been in the Republican Primary.  It was almost unheard of for a sitting governor to lose 
thirty counties in a Democratic Primary against only token opposition. Quinn could ill-afford to 
cede thirty counties Downstate to a totally unknown candidate like Hardiman without being in 
real jeopardy for the general election.  These results presaged the very steep hill he had to climb 
if he was going to win against a well- funded opponent in the general election.      
The Republican Primary Results 
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In the Republican Primary Bruce Rauner ran against three veteran Illinois office holders who 
were all widely respected.  All had run statewide before and all had served in the Illinois General 
Assembly.  Bill Brady was a State Senator from Bloomington who had run for Governor against 
Pat Quinn in 2010 and had come agonizingly close to defeating him. To get the 2010 
nomination, Brady defeated five other candidates in the Republican Primary, and some of the 
people he beat were very experienced and credible candidates. Kirk Dillard was a State Senator 
who had been Chief of Staff for a popular former Governor, Jim Edgar.  He came in second to 
Bill Brady in a very close Republican Primary in 2010, and based on that Dillard decided to run 
again in 2014.   
Dan Rutherford was the current Treasurer of Illinois who had won his first statewide race 
handily in 2010.  Before that he had been in the Illinois legislature with ten years of service in 
the Illinois House and seven years in the Illinois Senate (Illinois Blue Book, 2013-2014, 31).  
Thus in 2014 there were three deeply experienced Republican office holders, all of whom who 
had run statewide before, pitted against the newcomer, Bruce Rauner.   
Rauner won the Republican Primary with 329, 934 popular votes which was 40.13 percent of the 
total.  He was hard pressed by Dillard who was second with 305,120 votes or 37.22 percent of 
the total (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014, 5).  Dillard seemed to surge in the last two 
weeks of the campaign when several interest groups, especially some of the state’s public 
employee unions and other labor unions put up a last ditch fight to stop Rauner who had 
conducted his campaign partially based on reining in and reducing the power of the public 
employee unions and attacking union bosses. Bill Brady came in third with 123,708 votes or 
15.09 percent.  Dan Rutherford, whose campaign seemed to collapse in the last month amid 
headline-grabbing charges filed against him by a former employee, finished last with 61,948 
popular votes, or 7.56 percent (Ibid).  (See Appendix B and Map B).    
Rauner’s victory was somewhat scattered across the state, but the center of gravity was across a 
band of counties in northernmost Illinois near the Wisconsin border and in Cook and the 
suburban Collar Counties. Rauner carried Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will. 
Beating these Republican establishment candidates in the Collar Counties, and most notably 
besting Kirk Dillard in his home county of DuPage was quite a feat and indicated that Rauner 
would be a strong candidate in the general election. Rauner’s victory presaged some real strength 
for him for the fall election since those are the crucial suburban counties where Bill Brady fell 
short in his narrow loss to Pat Quinn in 2010.  Rauner also won in counties scattered across parts 
of central and southern Illinois and this gave him some hope for winning Downstate in the fall.   
Rauner’s challenge for the fall is also clearly indicated in Map B where it is evident that he lost 
most of central and southern Illinois to Dillard. (See also Appendix B). Those are the Downstate 
counties, typically bastions of Republican strength, he had to add to his column if he was going 
to have a good chance against Quinn in the fall.  He also had to hang onto the suburban Collar 
Counties and gain at least twenty percent of the vote in Chicago to be competitive with Quinn.   
Overall these victories, a narrow one for Rauner against three very creditable opponents, and a 
wider one that was still unimpressive for Quinn, indicated both the strengths and the weaknesses 
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each candidate carried into the fall campaign.  Quinn had to struggle to overcome the anger and 
dissent in his own party that resulted from his first five plus years of governing and some of the 
highly controversial decisions he had made.  If he could unite the party base and win a decent 
percent of the Independents, and perhaps a few Republicans, he might just pull out another 
squeaker in the fall. 
Rauner faced the same challenge in reverse.  He had to win over the elements of the Republican 
Party base who had voted for the other three candidates in the March primary.  Since he had not 
engaged in many negative attacks against the three primary opponents, and since they all really 
strongly opposed Quinn, this seemed doable.  Nevertheless, there are not enough Republicans in 
Illinois to win a statewide race. Rauner also had the nagging challenge of a Libertarian candidate 
on his right who was likely to draw away some of the most conservative Republican voters who 
did not completely accept Rauner’s conservative credentials.  So, it was especially important for 
Rauner to win the majority of the Independents and to lure disaffected Democrats over to his 
side.  Given the muttering in the ranks of the Democratic Party, and the many controversial 
budget, pensions and facilities closing decisions that Quinn had made as governor, this seemed 
somewhat feasible at the outset.   
The Polls and the Press 
Perhaps reflecting this scenario the public opinion polls at the outset showed a considerable 
margin for Rauner.  Early polls had him up by comfortable margins, sometimes even double 
digits, over Quinn (Dietrich, June 12, 2014).  It appeared the Governor was in trouble and had a 
long way to go to put together a coalition that could carry him to victory. 
Then in September the polls started closing up somewhat.  Quinn narrowed the gap to a range of 
only five to seven points.  By early October Quinn had closed the gap and for the first time 
achieved a modest lead over Rauner (Dietrich, October 7, 2014).   It seemed that Rauner was 
having difficulty closing the deal with the voters.  This doubt about the Republican was aided 
materially by the hard-hitting television commercials the Quinn campaign saturated the airways 
with in the summer and early fall.  Again and again they reminded the voters that Bruce Rauner 
“is not one of us”.  In other words, he is a very rich guy with nine homes, with several of those 
located in other states.  How can Rauner have any idea how your life feels when he is so 
insulated by his vast wealth, the Quinn ads asked repeatedly.  Indeed Quinn’s running mate for 
Lieutenant Governor, Paul Vallas, suggested at one point that Rauner was too rich to be a good 
governor, a quote which nicely captured the populist approach adopted by the Quinn campaign.   
In addition, Rauner was a private equity investor who had bought and sold numerous companies. 
Some of these companies had experienced legal problems; some had gone bankrupt; some had 
outsourced jobs overseas; and some had fired top executives in a harsh manner.  If all this 
sounded like Mitt Romney redux, it was not by accident.  The general strategy worked for 
Barack Obama in 2012 against a very rich opponent, so why not for Pat Quinn in 2014 against an 
even richer candidate? Rauner responded by adopting an “everyman” attitude and persona.  He 
ostentatiously wore jeans and a Carhartt barn coat and emphasized his humble roots and the hard 
work which had gotten him to the top.  He put a twenty year old Volkswagen van front and 
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center in one of his campaign ads and joked about his frugality.  Rauner certainly recognized the 
potential for Quinn’s attack ads to be effective in defining him in the minds of many Illinois 
voters and he took every precaution to try to adjust his image.   
Perhaps no other single event symbolized the pitfalls of trying to control and remake an image 
than one in late August when Rauner was featured in a candid photograph published in the 
Chicago Tribune picturing him with Mayor Rahm Emanuel of Chicago, as they vacationed in a 
posh resort on the Yellowstone River in Montana.  Emanuel was carrying a bottle of wine which 
was identified as a very expensive and rare label.  It turned out that Rauner belonged to an 
exclusive wine connoisseurs’ club where the entrance fees were $100,000 to $150,000 per year 
and that did not include the wine (Chase, Heinzmann, and Cohen, Aug.  29, 2014).  
That story seemed to summarize the Quinn case against Rauner in one simple and easily grasped 
tableau.  From then on, the Quinn advertising stressed the themes of Rauner’s wealth, the 
heartless character of some of the business decisions he had made, and his record in the dog-eat-
dog world of high finance.  A big part of the Democratic Party base started going home and 
closing ranks with the incumbent governor no matter what their past disappointments and 
conflicts with Quinn had been, and the polls closed up to indicate a very close race. The public 
employee unions, which had deep disagreements with Quinn and who felt completely betrayed 
by some of his actions, swallowed their grievances against him and moved to back his campaign 
against what they thought was an even worse and more adversarial alternative.    
Rauner was not devoid of ammunition in the negative advertisements war however.  His ads 
featured a series of charges against Quinn criticizing the way he had managed the state in the 
previous five years.  Quinn’s record on jobs and the budget and taxes was particularly 
vulnerable, and Rauner went after it with a vengeance.  Illinois had been somewhat slower than 
other Midwestern states in its recovery of jobs after the Great Recession of 2008-2009.  It has 
lost some businesses in well publicized moves to other states, and several other very loud and 
high profile business executives had threatened to move to other states or to never build any 
other facilities in Illinois if the corporate tax rates were not reduced.  A large percentage of 
voters will always oppose a tax increase and the Republicans mined the income tax increase 
effectively in their indictment of Quinn and the Democratic Party’s stewardship of state 
government (Jackson and Leonard, June, 2014).   
In addition, Quinn’s credentials as a true reformer were besmirched by highly public disclosures 
about an Anti-Violence Program his administration had launched just before the 2010 election.  
This program funneled $54.5 million to central city Chicago, supposedly targeted to some of the 
city’s most violent neighborhoods to fight crime and especially the gun violence which was 
roiling the city.  A subsequent investigation by the respected Illinois Auditor General, Bill 
Holland, revealed that many of these funds did not go to the most violent neighborhoods and the 
whole program seemed to have been mismanaged from the start.  Then the Department of Justice 
announced that a federal investigation had been opened by the U. S. Attorney.   Word that the 
grants were targeted by Chicago Aldermen did not help the credibility of the Quinn 
Administration and the media had a field day with the charges.  Rauner was happy to give the 
critics a megaphone that he paid for in his saturation advertising. The story became ironic when 
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one poll showed that the voters of Illinois considered Bruce Rauner to be more of a reformer 
than Pat Quinn who had made that label his signature claim over a long political career. Pat 
Quinn the reformer had become the incumbent holder and abuser of power and handy target for 
those who wanted change.    
So both sides had their problems and vulnerable spots.  After September the polls seemed to 
show this.  They almost all indicated that Quinn had made a comeback and that he was now 
competitive with Rauner. Several polls showed a virtual tie in the governor’s race (Pearson, 
September 14, 2014; Merda, October 23, 2014; Merda, October 27, 2014; Merda, November 3, 
2014).     Others showed Quinn with a modest lead over Rauner, but the statistical difference 
between the two candidates in almost all of the late polls remained within the margin of error.  
About all any commentator could say near the end was that this was going to be a close race, and 
that a lot depended on which campaign was able to do better on the always important ground 
game. “It could all come down to turnout” was the conventional wisdom over the last weekend 
before the November 4th  vote.    
The Results 
Election Day dawned with generally good weather across the state and with both sides having 
high hopes for a victory.  The polls had been close and Governor Quinn and Bruce Rauner both 
pointed to optimistic signs in their favor.  Both voted in the ritualistic photo opportunity, Rauner 
in Winnetka and Quinn in Chicago, and then retreated to their appointed hotel suites to await a 
victory speech or concession statement. 
It was not too deep in the election watch night that the returns built up indicating a clear win for 
Rauner.  He declared victory early and congratulated his cheering crowd of supporters while 
talking about his campaign theme of “a new day dawning for Illinois”.  Quinn refused to concede 
until Wednesday when it became obvious that there was no way for the totals to change the 
outcome no matter where the late count votes were and how many more he could theoretically 
receive.  Pat Quinn had lost his bid for re-election and it appeared that his life-long quest for 
public office in Illinois had ended, at least for now.     
Bruce Rauner also rode a Republican wave that swept the nation and the state and ensured 
victory for Republican candidates in almost all the competitive races.  They took over the 
majority in the U. S. Senate with a net gain of nine votes and padded their already outsized 
majority in the U. S. House.  They also increased by three their number of governor’s seats held 
and increased the number of state legislatures they controlled. The Republicans were swept into 
office nationwide partially on the weaknesses of Democratic turnout.  The total turnout was the 
lowest it had been since the mid-term elections held in 1942 at the height of World War II (The 
New York Times, November 14, 2014). Turnout was under fifty percent of the eligible voter 
population in 43 of the states, including Illinois.  The vaunted Democratic Party ground game 
had failed them as usually pro-Democratic constituencies stayed away in droves and the total 
electorate took on a decidedly Republican hue as it was markedly older, whiter, and more 
conservative than the total national electorate.   
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The same was generally true in Illinois where the Republicans won not only the Governor and 
Lt. Governor’s race but also took two congressional seats away from the Democrats. Turnout 
was abysmal for the Democrats in Illinois with a total of only 49.18 percent of registered voters 
who bothered to show up statewide. Compared to 2010, the last mid-term election, turnout was 
down by 1.35 percent and was down in total votes cast by 102,299 votes (Illinois State Board of 
Elections, 2010 and 2014). This was bad news for the Democrats. 
Turnout is always crucial for the Democrats and with turnout this low, nationally and in Illinois, 
the results were likely to be punishing for them, and their losses and Republican gains actually 
exceeded anyone’s expectations on Election Day. As in the 2010 mid-term elections, the national 
results promised to derail most of President Obama’s policy agenda for the last half of his term 
and to exacerbate what was already a deeply polarized and gridlocked government. No one could 
tell whether the same partisan gridlock was in store for Illinois due to its suddenly deeply divided 
state government.     
Illinois, which has come to be considered a deep blue state had resoundingly voted for divided 
government whether they realized it or not.  In the General Assembly, House Speaker Mike 
Madigan held onto his supermajority of 71 seats and in the Senate, President John Cullerton lost 
only one seat from his strong Democratic majority.  After almost two weeks of counting the late 
ballots it was also finally revealed that the very close race for Treasurer between former House 
Republican Minority Leader, Tom Cross, and Democratic State Senator, Michael Frerichs, had 
been won by the Democrat. When all the constitutional officer races were settled, the 
Republicans held three and the Democrats held three.  Illinois was deeply divided ideologically 
and geographically statewide and in the composition of its new government.  The Republicans 
had taken control of the executive branch for the first time since 2002 while the Democrats 
maintained a strong majority in the legislative branch. The previous Democratic control of state 
government would give way to divided government in January of 2015.  (See Map 3).   
Rauner did not just ride a national Republican wave into office.  His campaign and his massive 
personal expenditures of campaign cash had help create his own wave.  After it was over the 
estimates were that Rauner had invested some $27 million of his own funds in what became the 
most expensive governor’s race in state history. Rauner not only made a significant direct 
investment in his own campaign, he also used his money strategically to help other Republicans 
and he leveraged his considerable influence with other very wealthy people to raise funds from 
them as well.   
Table 1 shows the results.  Rauner beat Quinn by a margin of 50.27% of the total statewide vote 
compared to 46.35 % for Quinn.  Rauner won a total of 1,823,627 votes compared to 1,681, 343 
for Quinn.  This constituted a 142,284 total vote margin for Rauner.  In 2010 Quinn eked out a 
31,834 victory total over Bill Brady.  In 2014 Rauner improved on Brady’s performance 
statewide by 110, 242 votes.  That was more than enough to win since Quinn actually lost 63,876 
total votes in 2014 compared to his statewide performance in 2010.   
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Table 1 
2014 Illinois Governor’s Race by Geographic Region 
Region Rauner Quinn Winner’s % of 
2 Party Vote 
% of 2 Party 
Vote 
Cook County 447,388 870,866 66% Quinn 38% 
Collars 537,299 342,340 61% Rauner 25% 
Downstate 838,940 468,137 64% Rauner 37% 
Total State 1,823,627 1,681,343 52% Rauner  
 
Rauner won 101 out of the 102 counties, that is, every county except Cook.  Since Blagojevich’s 
initial victory in 2002, the Democrats’ county total had inexorably declined as they lost more and 
more counties during the subsequent elections.  The bottom was almost reached in 2010 when 
Quinn only won four counties; however, the bottom was definitively reached in 2014 when 
Quinn only managed to carry Cook out of the 102 total counties in Illinois.  At this point the state 
could hardly have been more polarized geographically than it was in 2014.     
Rauner also did better than Republican candidates usually do in Chicago and Cook County.  In 
Chicago 2014 turnout was down 33,470 total votes compared to 2010.  Quinn’s total in the fifty 
wards of Chicago was down by 12,600 and Rauner’s total in 2014 was up 15,321 compared to 
Brady’s total in 2010.  Rauner received 20.63 percent of the Chicago vote in 2014 compared to 
17.41 for Brady in 2010 (Chicago Board of Elections, 2010 and 2014).  So, Rauner slightly 
exceeded the targeted 20 percent marker which Republican candidates shoot for in the Chicago 
vote if they want to be competitive statewide.   
Quinn took 69.24% of the Cook County two party vote in 2010 and only 66% in 2014.  His Cook 
County total in 2014 was 29,966 votes below his 2010 total and Rauner’s 2014 Cook County 
total was 47,103 votes better than Brady did in 2010.  Quinn won Cook County by a 423,478 
total vote margin in 2014; however, he beat Brady by 500,547 in 2010.  That is a vote deficiency 
that is very difficult for a Democratic candidate to make up elsewhere and the only places to look 
are the Collar Counties and Downstate.  Both of those areas provided significant geographic 
advantages for Rauner.   Rauner ran extremely well in the Republican leaning Collar Counties 
which are now so essential to a successful campaign in Illinois politics. Rauner won all five of 
the Collar Counties, and by a substantial margin.   Rauner also exceeded the usual Republican 
benchmarks for Downstate.   
In 2010 Quinn had essentially won the race against Bill Brady by doing somewhat better than 
Democrats usually do in the suburban Collar Counties.  His totals there spelled the difference 
between the narrow defeat of the Democratic candidate for the U. S. Senate, Alexi Giannoulias, 
against Republican Mark Kirk compared to Quinn’s close victory over Brady that year.  In 2014 
the outcome was different and Rauner ran substantially better than Brady did in the Collar 
Counties in 2014.  As Table 1 indicates, Rauner captured 61 % of the two party vote in the 
Collar Counties compared to 39% for Quinn. This was the most critical deficit overall for Quinn 
compared to his performance in 2010. (See also Appendix C). 
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Downstate the news was even worse for Quinn.  In 2010 Quinn had only won four counties, 
Cook, St. Clair, Jackson, and Alexander, and he then lost all of those except Cook in 2014. 
Rauner took 64% of the Downstate vote in 2014 compared to 36 percent for Quinn.  Since 
Downstate constituted 37% of the statewide two party vote total in this election, Quinn’s almost 
two to one loss in the 96 Downstate Counties was too deep a hole to climb out of in 2014.  
As Map C indicates, there were thirty two counties in 2014 where Quinn improved on his 
percentage of the two party vote compared to 2010.  Those counties were mostly in central, west 
central, and northern Illinois. In 2010 Brady represented part of Bloomington and a state senate 
district centered in McLean County and it is not surprising that he showed real strength in central 
Illinois compared to Rauner in 2014.  None of the counties where Quinn’s 2014 performance in 
2014 was better than in 2010 was in southern Illinois.  The Quinn improvement counties were 
predominantly smaller and more rural counties and Quinn’s improvement percentage was small, 
all in the range of one to five percent.  On the other hand, there were several counties where his 
losses in 2014 compared to 2010 were in the ten to fourteen percent range.   
Most importantly, his loss of ground in Cook County alone at 3.18 percent was close to a fatal 
blow to Quinn’s re-election campaign.  That loss had to be coupled with Quinn’s losses in the 
Collar Counties compared to 2010 including DuPage at minus 3.83 percent; Lake at 5.09 
percent; McHenry at 5.12 percent; Kane at 3.58 percent and Will at 2.20 percent. (See Appendix 
C and Map C).  
 In the postmortems on the 2010 race, many experts observed that Quinn essentially won the 
governor’s chair through his victories in Chicago and Cook County and doing better than 
expected in the Collar Counties. This result was attributed to Brady’s hard right conservative 
stance on the social issues which did not play well in some suburban areas, and particularly 
among women voters.   The same case could be made for Quinn’s loss to Rauner in 2014 when 
Rauner did better than Republicans usually do in Cook County and did what Republicans need to 
do for a victory in the Collars.  It is notable that Rauner took great pains to stay away from the 
social issues during his campaign and he rarely mentioned any of those more divisive issues.  In 
addition, he often put his wife front and center during the campaign and took the unusual step of 
claiming that she was essentially a Democrat and that she had supported several prominent 
Democratic candidates in the past and that she was also pro-choice.   The fact that both Rauner 
and his wife had also been active in good government and school reform circles in Chicago gave 
some creditability to this attempt to moderate Rauner’s image, especially in the Chicago media 
market. No Democrat can lose the Collar Counties as badly as Quinn did in 2014 and still count 
on Chicago and to keep them competitive. Chicago has too small a percentage of the state’s total 
vote (18.35 in 2014) to constitute a realistic guarantee of Democratic victories in future statewide 
races.  Downstate has increasingly become Republican and counter-balances Chicago and Cook 
County.                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
In retrospect it turns out that the March primary was a prelude of the trouble to come for Quinn 
in the fall. The results conveyed by Map 1 from the Democratic Primary in March should have 
been a real red flag for Quinn and the Democrats.  For a sitting governor to lose thirty counties 
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Downstate to an unknown candidate from Chicago who had no money, no media, and no 
campaign staff indicated that the governor was in serious trouble from the beginning and that he 
had a very deep electoral hole to dig out of by November 4th.  In the general election Quinn lost 
all thirty of those downstate counties that had gone for Hardiman in the primary.  In twenty 
seven of those counties, Quinn’s percentage of the two party vote was less than his 2010 percent.  
In five of those counties his losses were above ten percent, and in ten of those counties Quinn’s 
losses were in the five to ten percent range.  His average loss in those twenty seven counties was 
5.70 percent when his 2014 totals were compared to his 2010 totals.   
Quinn’s policies were unpopular and his support eroded throughout Downstate and especially in 
Jackson and Alexander and surrounding counties when he closed the Tamms Prison in 
Alexander County.  This super maximum security state prison was the largest single employer in 
what was one of the poorest counties in the state or nation, and the loss of that prison and those 
jobs simply poisoned Quinn’s relationship with southern Illinois.  He also closed the 
Murphysboro Youth Center, a facility designed to rehabilitate young offenders, and the 
Carbondale House of Glass, a prison transition center, in Jackson County, which helped ensure 
his defeat in that county in 2014. In the Centralia area he started the process of shutting down the 
Murray Developmental Center which accounted for hundreds of state jobs.  At Dwight he closed 
the Dwight Correctional Center for Women and moved all the inmates to the Logan Correctional 
Center which had been a facility for men and which had to be retrofitted for women at 
considerable expense.   
Those cases of facility and state office closings were repeated across other rural counties 
downstate, and they became the indelible mark of the Quinn Administration in too many 
Downstate counties.  If general elections are retrospective evaluations on the incumbent’s 
performance in the past four years, as many political scientists argue, then 2014 was a 
resounding negative evaluation for Quinn’s stewardship of state government in Illinois (Fiorina, 
1981).   
The Quinn Administration insisted that those closures were necessary because of budget 
constraints and that they were also the right thing to do from a rational policy and responsible 
management standpoint.  That case may well have merit, but in areas where unemployment and 
poverty rates are high, rational budgetary cases do not necessarily carry the day in political 
campaigns.  Quinn struggled with the budget deficit for the entire time he was in office. In 2011 
Quinn and the Democratic majority in the General Assembly enacted an income tax increase in a 
genuine attempt to address the structural deficit that Illinois government had maintained for 
years under both Democratic and Republican administrations.  Yet, they had failed to balance the 
budget and pay off the accumulated state deficit entirely even though the pay down had reduced 
the backlog of unpaid bills from approximately $10 billion to approximately $4 billion after the 
income tax increase started generating new revenue.  That was a tangible indicator of real 
progress on the Illinois budgetary problem, but Quinn and the Democrats failed entirely to make 
that fact widely known and the prevailing narrative about the budget and the tax increase 
decidedly favored the Republicans. The Republicans and other critics, especially the major 
media outlets such as most notably the Chicago Tribune, consistently charged that the Democrats 
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had also increased some programs and started new ones instead of paying off the backlog of bills 
and they successfully purveyed the message that the new revenue from the income tax increase 
had been squandered.  No amount of splitting budgetary hairs by Quinn and his allies could 
overcome that damning charge and Rauner was quite successful in conveying the idea that he, as 
a very successful businessman, could handle the money better than Quinn and the Democrats.   
In the general election Rauner won all the counties, except for Cook, he had lost to the other 
three Republican candidates in the primary.  He successfully united the Republican Party in a 
way that eluded Quinn with the Democratic Party base.  The turnout in Chicago was one of the 
lowest in modern times (Korecki, November 5, 2014).  Turnout statewide at 49 percent was little 
better.  Quinn desperately needed the party base to vote at rates nearly comparable to the 
presidential election results for 2012.  Instead, the turnout rates in the Democratic strongholds 
sank below the 2010 mid-term election rates.  Turnout and a failure of the Democratic Party’s 
ground game outside Chicago was a significant part of the Quinn defeat. There are many reasons 
for the low mid-term elections turnout decline for the Democrats.  These include the fact that the 
party in the White House usually loses seats in the Congress and often loses governors’ races.  
This factor is also coupled with the job approval ratings of an incumbent president which in his 
sixth year are often in decline.  This was true of Obama who was in the low to mid-forties in 
most polls.  In addition, the Democratic base is heavily concentrated among low to moderate 
income people and minorities who are harder to get to the polls especially in mid-term elections.  
This was an especially big problem for the Democrats in 2014 when the national and state parties 
failed markedly in developing a narrative about the stakes involved in the election and thus 
provide a compelling incentive for hard to mobilize voters to get out and vote to save the 
candidates they already had in office.   
Conclusion 
In many respects this was a classic retrospective voting election for Illinois with the Democratic 
Governor and his record for the five years he had held the office becoming the major issue. 
Quinn’s record was long and convoluted and he had taken many public stances and advocated 
for controversial policies which were not always popular or well-received, the most prominent of 
which were the income tax increase and the pension reforms he championed. Being a Chief 
Executive means making decisions and often those decisions negatively impact people and 
groups who keep score.  Because of past mismanagement and especially irresponsible budget 
choices made by Democrats and Republicans alike and by governors and legislators past and 
present, there was a lot of hurt and not enough help for state government to spread around.  
Quinn had picked numerous fights and made a fair share of enemies, often within his own party.   
Bruce Rauner had the luxury of no public record of any kind to defend and his public position 
taking on policy was limited to this campaign while explaining what he might do if he were to be 
elected.  It was the known versus the unknown.  The choice came down to an evaluation of Pat 
Quinn’s very prominent past versus the unknown prospects of putting the state under new 
management and taking a chance that the results would be better than the Quinn record.  A 
majority of the voters decided to take that chance.  
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Turnout was certainly low and was one of the major failures for the Democrats; however, as 
indicated above by the story of the Tamms prison and other state facility closings, turnout alone 
was not the only problem that caused the failure of the Quinn campaign.  People say they want a 
balanced budget and the state constitution requires that the General Assembly pass a balanced 
budget every single fiscal year.  Yet, we built up a backlog of ten billion dollars of unpaid state 
bills over ten years.  How is that even possible?  The answer lies in a series of state budgets 
where the income projections are unrealistic, borrowing money via bonding and putting off and 
abdicating payments for major items like the state’s legally obligated contributions to the 
pension funds are common practices, and transfers of funds from earmarked accounts to the 
state’s general fund are common, even though those funds have to be paid back, usually in the 
next fiscal year.  The state had come to rely on a variety of subterfuge and fiction to manage its 
financial affairs, and this produced what is commonly called the “structural deficit” which 
simply means that there is no way the state’s real  income is going to meet its fixed financial 
obligations in any given year. 
To their credit the Quinn Administration and the majority Democrats in the General Assembly 
finally tried to do something realistic about the structural deficit with the income tax increase of 
2011.  And they did pay down a significant total of the backlog of unpaid bills by 2014.  The 
fatal mistake the Democrats made was in not making the necessary increases permanent from the 
start instead of promising to take it all off by the end of 2014 which ensured that the whole 
debate would be a central feature of the 2014 general election campaign.  In retrospect having 
that tax increase billed as temporary and set to expire at the end of 2014, looming in the middle 
of the statewide elections, was a grave political mistake Quinn and the Democrats made back in 
2011.  The Quinn Administration made enough cuts to be painful and to be significant 
contributions to reducing the deficit, but those cuts did not ensure a balanced budget anyway. 
The losses were real and hit real people, often those who were not well off to start with, living in 
poor counties and working at fairly low pay grades, people who are usually Democrats and turn 
out to vote for their party.   The public good arguments and benefits were amorphous collective 
goods and not at all evident to individual voters. The personal losses were real and felt directly 
by a lot of ordinary people, many of whom would usually vote for the Democrats.   
People tend to say repeatedly in public opinion polls that they want the deficit reduced and 
balanced budgets, and our polls at the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute show that consistently.  
But when it comes to making programmatic cuts, laying off workers, and reducing services 
people generally want those painful choices to be visited on someone else. My colleague, 
Charles Leonard and I have written an entire paper based on five years of statewide public 
opinion polls on that subject (Jackson and Leonard, 2014).  In that paper we described what we 
termed, “the dilemma of democracy”, i.e. the challenge for the political authorities to agree on a 
level of goods and services which address the state’s needs while also ensuring that the revenues 
(mostly from taxes) will be sufficient to meet those needs each year.  The challenge to the 
people, the voters, is to understand that this balance is necessary and not to be fooled by 
budgetary sleight of hand and political pandering.   Mass democracies the world over face that 
dilemma in the 21st century and the State of Illinois is no exception.   
18 
 
We will see now whether Bruce Rauner and the Republicans are willing to face that challenge 
honestly.  Rauner won partially on a promise to eliminate the increase in the income tax.  He did 
talk vaguely later in the campaign about a “phased in” reduction and it dropped to 3.75 percent 
on January 1, 2015.  He also talked vaguely about expanding the base of goods and services 
which should be covered by the state sales tax.  This is a realistic proposal which could 
legitimately address the structural deficit and one which many other states, including several 
which surround Illinois and are our competitors have already adopted.  He also talked incessantly 
about economic growth and the creation of new jobs as the all-purpose solution. That is a grand 
solution in the long term and almost no one opposes that idea. The challenge is how to get from 
here to there. The immediate problem is that such economic growth and new revenue will take 
some time to realize and any revenue from those sources will be in the future, much of it far into 
the future, and the budget challenge of significant lost revenue began on the first day of the new 
year in 2015, and becomes much larger and more intense at the beginning of the next fiscal year 
on July 1, 2015.   
So we will see if the Rauner Administration is really dedicated to meeting this “challenge of 
democracy” as we posed it in our recent paper, or if they will prove to be just another candidate 
with an ill-defined plan which promises no pain in order to win the election but then has no 
realistic plan to govern.   
At the end of the Governor and U. S. Senate races in 2010 in a report similar to this one, I wrote 
the following about Illinois and the nation: 
If you take the traditional red versus blue map approach and designate the counties 
according to which party won the majority of the two party vote, Illinois is indeed a very 
polarized state.  It is a microcosm of the United States and like the nation as a whole it is 
deeply divided into liberal versus conservative, Democratic versus Republican, rural 
versus urban areas where people see the world quite differently and vote quite differently.  
There is a deep and growing rural versus urban divide in this country.  The suburbs are 
the fastest growing parts of most states and the suburbs hold the key and the balance of 
power in this highly polarized equation.  In Illinois, as goes the suburban ring of Chicago, 
the Collar Counties and Cook outside the city, so goes Illinois in statewide elections 
(Jackson, 2011, 16). 
That mass polarization has continued and the divisions have grown deeper since the 2010 
midterms which was itself a deeply polarizing election.  It is hard to imagine a more polarized 
political system than the mid-term election results for 2014 produced nationwide and in Illinois.  
The rural versus urban divide became more notable and more complete in the nation when the 
Democrats lost almost everything outside the big city urban areas in the 2014 midterm elections. 
The South which was an almost one-party Democratic region for nearly a hundred years has now 
become an almost one-party Republican region in the last decade. Now 65 to 75 percent of white 
voters in the South routinely vote for the Republicans. Nationally President Obama received only 
43 percent of the white vote in 2008 and only 39 percent in 2012.  The African-American vote 
for the Democrats now stands above 90 percent in presidential elections (Stanley and Niemi, 
2013, 116-117).    Racial polarization between white and black voters is the deepest in American 
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history.   Almost all the competitive races for the U. S. Senate, the U. S. House and the 
governorships went to the Republicans in the red wave election of 2014.  Partisan and 
ideological gridlock, which had been deep previously promised to get deeper in the run up to the 
2016 presidential elections.   
This pattern was replicated in Illinois where the only county Pat Quinn won in 2014 was Cook to 
exacerbate an already polarized outcome from 2010 when he only won Cook plus St. Clair, 
Jackson and Alexander in southern Illinois and the Metro-East area.  In 2014 even those former 
bastions of Democratic strength were lost to the Republicans and the polarization of the state was 
almost complete. Illinois since 2000 has frequently been termed a “Dark Blue” state (Green, 
2007).  That may have been an apt characterization in 2007 when Paul Green wrote it, but it is 
clearly not adequate for the changed circumstances of today.  Illinois is now much more 
accurately described as a competitive state which slightly leans Democratic. If you view the map 
of Illinois representing the governor’s race outcome in 2014 it is a sea of red surrounding the 
blue island of Chicago and Cook County.  The results in 2010 and especially in 2014 show that 
in any given election with the right circumstances and the right candidates Republicans can 
certainly win statewide elections.  This is especially true in the mid-term elections which are 
lower turnout elections disadvantaging the Democrats.  The sooner the Democratic Party of 
Illinois realizes this, the more effective they can be in addressing their problems outside Cook 
County.  One way to accomplish this is through successful governance.  In the near future 
successful governing will require compromise and seeking real solutions to real problems by 
both parties.  It will test the mettle of the new Republican Governor and his protagonists who are 
the veteran leaders in the state legislature on both sides of the aisle.   
The chances of partisan gridlock in Illinois certainly exist also but there is some reason to believe 
that our fate at the state level need not be as extreme as the national scene.  Rauner did not 
campaign as a Tea Party Republican.  Indeed, he went out of his way to emphasize his 
moderation at least on the social issues and his record in Chicago area philanthropic circles, 
especially focused on education reform, indicate something of a social conscience.  He is from 
the big business and country club wing of the Republican Party which tends to hold the most 
power in Illinois Republican circles.  If Rauner can find some help from his Republican allies in 
the General Assembly and they put some votes on controversial bills, and if he can also make 
common cause with the Democrats who lead the legislative branch, then Illinois may yet escape 
some of the more dysfunctional tenets of our polarized national political system.   
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Appendix A
 Democratic Primary Results 2014 by County
QUINN Q H Hardiman H Q
Adams 62 38 Alexander 63 37
Bond 52 48 Calhoun 54 46
Boone 57 43 Cass 52 48
Brown 57 43 Christian 54 46
Bureau 68 32 Clinton 63 37
Carroll 55 45 Crawford 54 46
Champaign 70 30 Cumberland 54 46
Clark 51 49 Edgar 52 48
Clay 50.4 49.6 Fayette 55 45
Coles 52 48 Franklin 56 44
Cook 79 21 Fulton 52 48
DeKalb 73 27 Gallatin 58 42
DeWitt 51 49 Greene 50.5 49.5
Douglas 53 47 Hamilton 56 44
DuPage 79 21 Jefferson 60 40
Edwards 69 31 Johnson 56 44
Effingham 53 47 Macoupin 54 46
Ford 53 47 Marion 72 28
Grundy 65 35 Mason 52 48
Hancock 54 46 Moultrie 58 42
Hardin 52 48 Perry 57 43
Henderson 53 47 Pope 52 48
Henry 62 38 Pulaski 58 42
Iroquois 61 39 Randolph 60 40
Jackson 59 41 Saline 56 44
Jasper 51 49 Shelby 67 33
Jersey 53 47 Union 64 36
JoDaviess 66 34 Vermillion 52 48
Kane 75 25 Washington 62 38
Kankakee 65 35 Williamson 51 49
Kendall 73 27
Know 62 38
Lake 82 28
LaSalle 67 33
Lawrence 61 39 % of Vote Votes
Lee 59 41 Quinn 71.94% 321,818
Livingston 58 42
Logan 53 47 Hardiman 28.06% 125,500
Macon 55 45
Madison 55 45
Marshall 57 43 72
Massac 59 41
McDonough 65 35 30
McHenry 72 28
McLean 68 32
Quinn # of Counties 
Carried
Hardiman # of Counties 
Carried
Appendix A
 Democratic Primary Results 2014 by County
QUINN Q H
Menard 56 44
Mercer 55 45
Monroe 70 30
Montgomery 53 47
Morgan 52 48
Ogle 53 47
Peoria 66 34
Piatt 60 40
Pike 52 48
Putnam 60 40
Richland 56 44
Rock Island 64 36
Sangamon 65 35
Schuyler 50.3 49.7
Scott 54 46
St. Clair 66 34
Stark 58 42
Stephenson 58 42
Tazewell 61 39
Wabash 63 37
Warren 62 38
Wayne 56 44
White 52 48
Whiteside 59 41
Will 71 29
Winnebago 56 44
Woodford 57 43
Appendix B
Republican Primary Results by County
Rauner % Dillard % Brady % Rutherford %
Alexander 36 Adams 70 Mason 35 Livingston 50
Boone 40 Bond 41 McLean 32 Wabash 29
Bureau 37 Brown 78 Washington 34 Hardin 29
Calhoun 32 Cass 60 Wayne 34
Carroll 38 Champaign 40
Cook 59 Christian 46
Crawford 33 Clark 34
Dekalb 44 Clay 41
DuPage 46 Clinton 43
Counties 
Carried % of vote # of votes
Edwards 33 Coles 41 Rauner 33 40.13 328,924
Effinghamm 34 Cumberlan 44 Dillard 62 37.22 305,120
Fayette 37 DeWitt 31 Brady 4 15.09 123,708
Grundy 40 Douglas 41 Rutherford 3 7.58 61,948
Henderson 37 Edgar 35
Henry 41 Ford 30
JoDaviess 33 Franklin 53
Kane 48 Fulton 43
Kankakee 43 Gallatin 36
Kendall 44 Greene 45
Lake 55 Hamilton 30
LaSalle 42 Hancock 56
Lawrence 38 Irroquois 32
Macon 38 Jackson 56
McHenry 53 Jasper 43
Mercer 44 Jefferson 36
Putnam 35 Jersey 36
Rock Island 47 Johnson 48
St. Clair 40 Know 46
Stephenson 37 Lee 40
Warren 37 Logan 45
Whiteside 39 Macoupin 40
Will 48 Madison 39
Winnebago 39 Marion 43
Marshall 36
Massac 60
McDonoug 63
Menard 52
Monroe 35
Montgomery 42
Morgan 58
Moultrie 44
Ogle 37
Peoria 45
Perry 55
Appendix B
Republican Primary Results by County
Rauner % Dillard % Brady % Rutherford %
Piatt 39
Pike 62
Pope 54
Pulaski 48
Randolph 50
Richland 48
Saline 44
Sangamon 62
Schuyler 63
Scott 66
Shelby 38
Stark 36
Tazewell 42
Union 63
Vermilion 41
White 34
Williamson 54
Woodford 31
Appendix C
County Quinn (D) Brady (R) D % of vote R % of vote Quinn (D) Rauner (R) D % of vote R % of vote
% Change 
in (D) vote
Adams 4883 17765 21.57% 78.43% 4342 17146 20.21% 79.79% -1.36%
Alexander 1371 1248 52.35% 47.65% 1015 1137 47.17% 52.83% -5.18%
Bond 1847 3345 35.57% 64.43% 1442 3082 31.87% 68.13% -3.70%
Boone 4414 9074 32.73% 67.27% 5029 9529 34.54% 65.46% 1.81%
Brown 449 1503 24.93% 75.07% 364 1120 24.53% 75.47% -0.40%
Bureau 4371 7319 37.74% 62.26% 4731 7258 39.46% 60.54% 1.72%
Calhoun 961 1227 43.92% 56.08% 683 1157 37.12% 62.88% -6.80%
Carroll 1445 3361 30.01% 69.99% 1582 3621 30.41% 69.59% 0.40%
Cass 1088 2433 30.09% 69.91% 1249 2242 35.78% 64.22% 5.69%
Champaign 21053 29297 41.81% 58.19% 22314 29918 42.72% 57.28% 0.91%
Christian 3820 7465 33.85% 66.15% 3265 7462 30.44% 69.56% -3.41%
Clark 1629 4231 27.78% 72.22% 1083 3805 22.16% 77.84% -5.62%
Clay 1158 3484 24.95% 75.05% 721 2948 19.65% 80.35% -5.30%
Clinton 3653 8547 29.94% 70.06% 2270 9699 18.97% 81.03% -10.97%
Coles 4100 9713 26.69% 73.31% 4376 9507 31.52% 68.48% 4.83%
Cook 900832 400285 69.24% 30.76% 870866 447388 66.06% 33.94% -3.18%
Crawford 1691 4864 25.80% 74.20% 1505 4375 25.60% 74.40% -0.20%
Cumberland 970 2993 24.48% 75.52% 926 2739 25.27% 74.73% 0.79%
DeKalb 10852 14949 42.06% 57.94% 10944 16246 40.25% 59.75% -1.81%
DeWitt 1358 3920 25.73% 74.27% 1299 3859 25.18% 74.82% -0.55%
Douglas 1239 4753 20.68% 79.32% 1156 4522 20.36% 79.64% -0.32%
DuPage 110117 154986 41.54% 58.46% 105374 174041 37.71% 62.29% -3.83%
Edgar 1607 4890 24.73% 75.27% 1435 4491 24.22% 75.78% -0.51%
Edwards 380 1800 17.43% 82.57% 314 1862 14.43% 85.57% -3.00%
Effingham 2381 9856 19.46% 80.54% 2272 9352 19.55% 80.45% 0.09%
Fayette 1598 4675 25.48% 74.52% 1481 4638 24.20% 75.80% -1.28%
Ford 906 3452 20.79% 79.21% 854 3401 20.07% 79.93% -0.72%
Franklin 5741 6395 47.31% 52.69% 4104 7677 34.84% 65.16% -12.47%
Fulton 4748 5786 45.07% 54.93% 4976 5173 49.03% 50.97% 3.96%
Gallatin 883 1148 43.47% 56.53% 564 1145 33.00% 67.00% -10.47%
Greene 1305 2739 32.27% 67.73% 1159 2820 29.13% 70.87% -3.14%
Grundy 5813 9132 38.90% 61.10% 6073 9760 38.36% 61.64% -0.54%
Hamilton 1206 2052 37.02% 62.98% 780 2136 26.75% 73.25% -10.27%
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Hancock 1631 4780 25.44% 74.56% 1343 4271 23.92% 76.08% -1.52%
Hardin 680 1303 34.29% 65.71% 419 922 31.25% 68.75% -3.04%
Henderson 1297 1888 40.72% 59.28% 912 1559 36.91% 63.09% -3.81%
Henry 5980 10900 35.43% 64.57% 5958 10829 35.49% 64.51% 0.06%
Iriquois 1997 7741 20.51% 79.49% 1723 7329 19.03% 80.97% -1.48%
Jackson 7386 7220 50.57% 49.43% 6876 8114 45.87% 54.13% -4.70%
Jasper 1008 2837 26.20% 73.80% 936 2897 24.42% 75.58% -1.78%
Jefferson 4030 7500 34.95% 65.05% 3310 8281 28.56% 71.44% -6.39%
Jersey 2509 4724 34.69% 65.31% 2292 5215 30.53% 69.47% -4.16%
JoDaviess 2842 4763 37.37% 62.63% 2700 4726 36.36% 63.64% -1.01%
Johnson 1309 3021 30.23% 69.77% 1099 3170 25.74% 74.26% -4.49%
Kane 48579 68426 41.52% 58.48% 46363 75835 37.94% 62.06% -3.58%
Kankakee 12046 17207 41.12% 58.88% 12431 20449 37.81% 62.19% -3.31%
Kendall 11158 17130 39.44% 60.56% 11361 19946 36.29% 63.71% -3.15%
Knox 6465 9085 41.16% 58.84% 6925 8311 45.45% 54.55% 4.29%
Lake 86878 102675 45.83% 54.17% 79939 116277 40.74% 59.26% -5.09%
LaSalle 13495 17378 43.71% 56.29% 13871 19843 41.14% 58.86% -2.57%
Lawrence 1642 3229 33.71% 66.29% 1216 2670 31.29% 68.71% -2.42%
Lee 3246 6838 32.19% 67.81% 4061 6527 38.35% 61.65% 6.16%
Livingston 3503 8273 29.75% 70.25% 3073 7335 29.53% 70.47% -0.22%
Logan 1953 6304 23.65% 76.35% 2201 5864 27.29% 72.71% 3.64%
Macon 11966 21914 35.32% 64.68% 11345 20467 35.66% 64.34% 0.34%
Macoupin 6042 9278 39.44% 60.56% 5169 9278 35.78% 64.22% -3.66%
Madison 33060 44382 42.70% 57.30% 28444 46075 38.17% 61.83% -4.53%
Marion 4168 7016 35.20% 64.80% 2291 8683 20.88% 79.12% -14.32%
Marshall 1162 2744 29.75% 70.25% 1285 2666 32.52% 67.48% 2.77%
Mason 1594 2836 35.99% 64.01% 1891 2952 39.05% 60.95% 3.06%
Massac 1513 3170 32.31% 67.69% 1268 2828 30.96% 69.04% -1.35%
McDonough 2792 5716 32.83% 67.17% 2842 5242 35.16% 64.84% 2.33%
McHenry 31695 53585 37.14% 62.86% 29116 61827 32.02% 67.98% -5.12%
McLean 15723 32972 32.29% 67.71% 16600 31646 34.41% 65.59% 2.12%
Menard 1324 3159 29.53% 70.47% 1371 3239 29.74% 70.26% 0.21%
Mercer 2403 3710 39.31% 60.69% 2377 3823 38.34% 61.66% -0.97%
Monroe 3849 7639 33.50% 66.50% 3138 8843 26.19% 73.81% -7.31%
Montgomery 3262 5670 36.52% 63.48% 2752 5260 34.35% 65.65% -2.17%
2010 General Election Quinn v. Brady 2014  General Election Quinn v. Rauner
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Morgan 3162 6738 31.94% 68.06% 3182 7192 30.67% 69.33% -1.27%
Moultrie 1117 3346 25.03% 74.97% 1021 3261 23.84% 76.16% -1.19%
Ogle 4542 11318 28.64% 71.36% 5015 11236 30.86% 69.14% 2.22%
Peoria 20039 28955 40.90% 59.10% 21232 28127 43.02% 56.98% 2.12%
Perry 2997 3898 43.47% 56.53% 2294 4481 33.86% 66.14% -9.61%
Piatt 1619 4653 25.18% 74.82% 1702 4975 25.49% 74.51% 0.31%
Pike 1514 4391 25.64% 74.36% 1268 4110 23.58% 76.42% -2.06%
Pope 566 1309 30.19% 69.81% 409 1057 27.90% 72.10% -2.29%
Pulaski 1082 1631 39.88% 60.12% 917 1487 38.14% 61.86% -1.74%
Putnam 913 1195 43.31% 56.69% 1096 1264 46.44% 53.56% 3.13%
Randolph 4607 6227 42.52% 57.48% 3838 6607 36.74% 63.26% -5.78%
Richland 1266 3684 25.58% 74.42% 1171 3525 24.94% 75.06% -0.64%
Rock Island 20514 22904 47.25% 52.75% 20495 22680 47.47% 52.53% 0.22%
Saline 3060 4448 40.76% 59.24% 2375 4839 32.92% 67.08% -7.84%
Sangamon 25038 42278 37.19% 62.81% 27822 39692 41.21% 58.79% 4.02%
Schuyler 845 1891 30.88% 69.12% 990 2051 32.56% 67.44% 1.68%
Scott 422 1235 25.47% 74.53% 480 1538 23.79% 76.21% -1.68%
Shelby 809 5638 24.39% 75.61% 1780 5726 23.71% 76.29% -0.68%
St. Clair 39152 37772 50.90% 49.10% 33474 39438 45.91% 54.09% -4.99%
Stark 543 1242 30.42% 69.58% 537 1246 30.12% 69.88% -0.30%
Stephenson 4209 9293 31.17% 68.83% 4558 9338 32.80% 67.20% 1.63%
Tazewell 13189 29248 31.08% 68.92% 13538 26991 33.40% 66.60% 2.32%
Union 2411 3676 39.61% 60.39% 1887 3900 32.61% 67.39% -7.00%
Vermilion 6561 14251 31.52% 68.48% 6290 14028 30.96% 69.04% -0.56%
Wabash 1054 2728 27.87% 72.13% 885 2809 23.96% 76.04% -3.91%
Warren 1965 3602 35.30% 64.70% 1923 3281 36.95% 63.05% 1.65%
Washington 1495 3950 27.46% 72.54% 1004 4354 18.74% 81.26% -8.72%
Wayne 1123 5404 17.21% 82.79% 625 4899 11.31% 88.69% -5.90%
White 1510 3537 29.92% 70.08% 1339 4358 23.50% 76.50% -6.42%
Whiteside 6981 10510 39.91% 60.09% 7125 9436 43.02% 56.98% 3.11%
Will 79786 97831 44.93% 55.07% 81548 109319 42.73% 57.27% -2.20%
Williamson 8654 12240 41.42% 58.58% 6177 13081 32.07% 67.93% -9.35%
Winnebago 28398 46492 37.92% 62.08% 30691 44785 40.66% 59.34% 2.74%
Woodford 2990 10170 22.71% 77.29% 3209 10061 24.18% 75.82% 1.47%
Total 1745219 1713385 50.46% 49.54% 1681343 1823627 47.97% 52.03% -2.49%
2010 General Election Quinn v. Brady 2014  General Election Quinn v. Rauner
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MAP A
March 2014 Democratic Primary
Pat Quinn v. Tio Hardiman
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March 2014 Republican Primary
Dillard, Rauner, Brady, Rutherford
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MAP C
Illinois Primary: 2014 v. 2010
Democratic v. Republican Gains/Losses
Counties where Quinn’s % of the vote 
improved in 2014 over 2010 (N = 32)
Counties where Rauner’s % of the Vote 
Improved Over Brady 2014 v. 2010
(and Quinn’s Decreased) (N = 70)
